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This Article is dedicated to the memory of Professor Svitlana 
Kravchenko, who inspired and empowered dedicated public interest 
environmental advocates around the world. We will continue her fight 
for the human right to live in a healthy environment for both present 
and future generations. 
The boreal forest in Alberta, Canada overlays one of the world’s 
largest deposits of crude oil, of which 99% come from oil sands,1 and 
the oil industry is pushing to expand the extraction and production of 
this hard-to-get, dirty oil.2 The development of the Athabasca oil 
	
1 Facts and Statistics, GOV’T OF ALBERTA, ENERGY, http://www.energy.gov.ab.ca 
/OilSands/791.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2012); see also What Is Oil Sands?, ALBERTA 
ENERGY, http://www.energy.gov.ab.ca/OilSands/793.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2012) 
(“Though they appear to be visibly similar, tar and oil sands are different; while oil sand is 
a naturally occurring petrochemical, tar is a synthetically produced substance . . . .”). 
2 See MARC HUOT ET AL., PEMBINA INST., OILSANDS AND CLIMATE CHANGE: HOW 
CANADA’S OILSANDS ARE STANDING IN THE WAY OF EFFECTIVE CLIMATE ACTION 
(updated Oct. 14, 2011), available at http://pubs.pembina.org/reports/us-oilsands-and        
-climate-briefing-note-201109b.pdf; DANIELLE DROITSCH ET AL., PEMBINA INST., 
CANADIAN OIL SANDS AND GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: THE FACTS IN PERSPECTIVE 1 
(Aug. 2010), available at http://pubs.pembina.org/reports/briefingnoteosghg.pdf  
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sands in Alberta is the largest and, some have said, one of the most 
environmentally destructive industrial projects in the world.3 Oil is 
extracted from large deposits of bitumen (a mixture of sand, clay, and 
heavy crude oil) in one of two ways—surface strip mining or in situ 
(in place) extraction techniques for deep oil sands.4 Both extraction 
methods adversely impact human rights and indigenous peoples’ 
rights;5 disturb Alberta’s ancient boreal forest,6 which serves as a vast 
	
(“Emissions from oil sands more than doubled, increasing by 121 per cent, between 1990 
and 2008. Planned growth indicates greenhouse gas emissions from oil sands will continue 
to rise resulting in a near tripling of emissions between 2008 and 2020.”); PEMBINA INST., 
MINING VS. IN SITU (May 27, 2010), available at http://pubs.pembina.org/reports/mining-
vs-in-situ.pdf. 
3 What Is Oil Sands?, GOV’T OF ALBERTA, ENERGY, supra note 1 (“[T]he Athabasca 
[oil sands] deposit in Alberta is the largest, most developed” in the world.); FRIENDS OF 
THE EARTH, DIRTY BUSINESS 5 (Apr. 2011), available at http://libcloud.s3.amazonaws 
.com/93/c2/f/561/Dirty_Business_TransCanada_Web.pdf (referring to Alberta’s oil sands 
extraction project as “one of the dirtiest and most environmentally destructive projects on 
the planet”); see also LINDSAY FISCHER ET AL., PEMBINA INST., SUMMARY OF MAJOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT POLICY DEFICIENCIES IN THE CANADIAN OILSANDS: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. DECISION MAKERS 2 (Sept. 14, 2011), available at http://pubs. 
pembina.org/reports/environmental-mgmt-briefing-note-kxl.pdf (“In the absence of 
responsible environmental policy, greenhouse gas emissions from the oilsands will triple 
from 2005 levels by 2020, caribou could become locally extinct, water quality will 
deteriorate, and lack of cumulative effects management will lead to unrestrained boreal 
forest disturbance.”). 
4 Only 20% of Alberta’s oil sands are recoverable through surface mining; the other 
80% must be extracted through the much more GHG-intensive in situ process. Oil Sands 
101, GOV’T OF ALBERTA, ENERGY, http://www.energy.gov.ab.ca/OilSands/1715.asp (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2012); PEMBINA INST., MINING VS. IN SITU, supra note 2 (“In situ 
operations generate two and [a] half times as much greenhouse gas per barrel of bitumen 
as oil sands mines.”); see also JEREMY MOORHOUSE ET AL., PEMBINA INST., DRILLING 
DEEPER: THE IN SITU OIL SANDS REPORT CARD 17–19 (Mar. 2010), available at 
http://pubs.pembina.org/reports/in-situ-report-card.pdf (describing oil sands surface 
mining and the two main types of thermal in situ technologies used for deep oil sands). 
5 See GABRIEL DERITA & TOM VALTIN, SIERRA CLUB, TOXIC TAR SANDS: PROFILES 
FROM THE FRONT LINES 2 (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.sierraclub.org/dirtyfuels 
/tar-sands/faces/TarSands.pdf (“The process leaves behind giant toxic lakes that are linked 
to abnormally high rates of cancer in neighboring communities and are large enough to be 
seen from space.”); INDIGENOUS ENVTL. NETWORK, TAR SANDS AND INDIGENOUS 
RIGHTS 1 (Apr. 2011), available at http://www.ienearth.org/docs/IENFactsheet_2.pdf 
(referring to oil sands production in Canada as “the largest industrial project on Mother 
Earth: the Tar Sands Gigaproject. Northern Alberta is ground zero with over 20 
corporations operating in the tar sands sacrifice zone, with expanded developments being 
planned. The cultural heritage, land, ecosystems and human health of First Nation 
communities . . . are being sacrificed for oil money in what has been termed a ‘slow 
industrial genocide.’ Infrastructure projects linked to the tar sands expansion such as . . .  
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carbon sink and home to some of the world’s most productive 
habitat;7 and are incredibly greenhouse gas (GHG) and water 
intensive.8 Dr. James Hansen, one of the world’s leading climate 
scientists, asserts “that no amount of conservation measures and a 
switch to alternative energy sources could offset the additional global 
warming that would occur if Canada’s vast tar sands oil reserves are 
extracted and burned”9 and that it would be “game over for the 
climate.”10 The public’s quest for information about the role of the 
United States in the development of these oil sands and the ability of 
the public to meaningfully participate in any decisions made about oil 
	
the Keystone XL pipeline, threaten First Nation communities in British Columbia, Canada 
and American Indian communities throughout the United States.”). 
6 If the mining zone is completely developed, 3,300 km2 of land will be cleared. 
RICHARD SCHNEIDER & SIMON DYER, PEMBINA INST., DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: 
IMPACTS OF IN SITU OIL SANDS DEVELOPMENT ON ALBERTA’S BOREAL FOREST 1 (Aug. 
2006), available at http://pubs.pembina.org/reports/1000-cuts.pdf. Deep oil sands in 
Northeast Alberta cover approximately 138,000 km2, an area that is roughly the size of 
Florida. If all of the deep oil sands in Alberta were developed, 11,454 km2 of boreal forest 
would be cleared. PEMBINA INST., DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: DEEP OIL SANDS MAY 
TRANSFORM 21% OF ALBERTA (Aug. 2006), available at http://pubs.pembina.org/reports 
/1000-cuts-fact-sheet.pdf. 
7 See SCHNEIDER & DYER, supra note 6, at 1 (“Canada’s boreal region contains one-
quarter of the world’s remaining original forests. It is home to a rich array of wildlife 
including migratory songbirds, waterfowl, bears, wolves and the world’s largest caribou 
herds. Canada’s boreal is a major part of the global boreal region that encircles the Earth’s 
northern hemisphere, storing more freshwater in its wetlands and lakes and more carbon in 
its trees, soil, and peat than anywhere else on the planet.”); JEFF WELLS ET AL., IMPACT 
ON BIRDS OF TAR SANDS OIL DEVELOPMENT IN CANADA’S BOREAL FOREST (Dec. 2008), 
available at http://www.nrdc.org/wildlife/borealbirds.pdf. 
8 PEMBINA INST., MINING VS. IN SITU, supra note 2. 
9 Monitor Staff, No rush to make pipeline decision, CONCORD MONITOR, Sept. 9, 2011, 
http://www.concordmonitor.com/article/278649/no-rush-to-make-pipeline-decision. 
10 Id.; James Hansen, Game Over for the Climate, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/opinion/game-over-for-the-climate.html (“Canada’s 
tar sands . . . contain twice the amount of carbon dioxide emitted by global oil use in our 
entire history. If we were to fully exploit this new oil source, and continue to burn our 
conventional oil, gas and coal supplies, concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere 
eventually would reach levels higher than in the Pliocene era, more than 2.5 million years 
ago, when sea level was at least 50 feet higher than it is now. That level of heat-trapping 
gases would assure that the disintegration of the ice sheets would accelerate out of control. 
Sea levels would rise and destroy coastal cities. Global temperatures would become 
intolerable. Twenty to 50 percent of the planet’s species would be driven to extinction. 
Civilization would be at risk.”); see also supra note 2; Endangerment and Cause or 
Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 
Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,516 (Dec. 15, 2009) (“[G]reenhouse gases in the atmosphere may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger the public health and to endanger the public welfare 
of current and future generations.”). 
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sands development hinges in part on the efficacy of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 
In enacting NEPA in 1970, the United States Congress  
recogniz[ed] the profound impact of man’s activity on the 
interrelations of all components of the natural environment, 
particularly the profound influences of . . . resource exploitation . . . 
and . . . the critical importance of restoring and maintaining 
environmental quality to the overall welfare and development of 
man.11  
A fundamental purpose of NEPA is “to promote efforts which will 
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere.”12 
Meaningful and effective public participation and access to 
information are the foundations of NEPA, a law meant to “ensure that 
federal agencies are informed of environmental consequences before 
making decisions and that the information is available to the 
public.”13 
NEPA applies to the permitting of the proposed Keystone XL oil 
sands pipeline. In 2008, TransCanada, a Canadian corporation, 
applied to the U.S. Department of State (State Department) for a 
Presidential Permit for the proposed Keystone XL project, which 
included the “construction, connection, operation, and maintenance” 
of a 1,711-mile crude oil pipeline and related facilities to transport up 
to 830,000 barrels of crude oil per day from Alberta, Canada, to 
delivery points in Oklahoma and Texas.14 In January 2012, the State 
	
11 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2012); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1) (“[I]t is the continuing 
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means . . . to improve and 
coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation 
may . . . fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for 
succeeding generations.”). As part of that responsibility, federal agencies must disclose 
and consider the “relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the 
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iv) 
(2012). 
12 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012). 
13 Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 970–71 (9th Cir. 
2003) (quoting Okanogan Highlands Alliance v. Williams, 236 F.3d 468, 473 (9th Cir. 
2000)). 
14 U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (DOS FEIS), 
INTRODUCTION 1-1 to 1-2 (Aug. 26, 2011), available at http://keystonepipeline-xl.state. 
gov/documents/organization/182011.pdf. “In addition to its application to DOS, Keystone 
also filed a right-of-way (ROW) application under Section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act 
of 1920 (MLA), as amended, with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) for the  
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Department and Obama Administration denied the permit, a decision 
compelled by the imposition of an arbitrary and politically motivated 
sixty-day deadline set by Congress, which did not allow sufficient 
time to evaluate the impacts of the pipeline.15 
In February 2012, TransCanada pushed forward with building the 
southern leg of the project from Oklahoma to the Gulf Coast in order 
to avoid a full State Department review of that segment, as it does not 
involve a border crossing.16 The move was welcomed by President 
Obama, who directed federal agencies to “expedite” the review of this 
project,17 “cut through the red tape, . . . and get it done.”18 In July 
2012, the southern portion was approved.19 In May 2012, 
TransCanada reapplied for the Presidential Permit for the remaining 
portion of the pipeline.20 The State Department now has the 
opportunity to fully disclose the environmental impacts of the 
proposed pipeline in its new review process and correct the many 
inadequacies in its initial review; but, with all of the indications that 
	
proposed Project across federal lands.” Id. at 1-1. This Article does not address the ROW 
application. 
15 Presidential Memorandum—Implementing Provisions of the Temporary Payroll Tax 
Cut Continuation Act of 2011 Relating to the Keystone XL Pipeline Permit, 77 Fed. Reg. 
5614 (Feb. 3, 2012); John M. Broder & Dan Frosch, Rejecting Pipeline Proposal, Obama 
Blames Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/us/ 
state-dept-to-put-oil-pipeline-on-hold.html. This deadline, set by congressional 
Republicans, was a partisan response to the State Department’s decision to seek additional 
environmental review for alternative routes around sensitive grasslands and aquifers. Id. In 
response to the denial, congressional Republicans have made attempts to circumvent the 
NEPA and National Interest Determination processes and approve the pipeline themselves 
through legislation. See, e.g., Ben Geman, Senate GOP pushes for Keystone vote on 
highway measure, THE HILL, Feb. 13, 2012, http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire 
/210213-senate-republicans-to-push-keystone-on-highway-bill. 
16 Jeffrey Jones & Roberta Rampton, TransCanada chops up Keystone XL to push it 
ahead, REUTERS, Feb. 27, 2012, http://ca.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idCATRE81 
Q1II20120227. 
17 Id.; Presidential Memorandum—Expediting Review of Pipeline Projects from 
Cushing, Oklahoma, to Port Arthur, Texas, and Other Domestic Pipeline Infrastructure 
Projects, 77 Fed. Reg. 18,891, 18,892 (Mar. 28, 2012). 
18 Steven Mufson & Juliet Eilperin, TransCanada gets key go-ahead for final southern 
leg of pipeline project, WASH. POST, July 27, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com 
/business/keystone-xl-pipeline-permits-deal-blow-to-groups-trying-to-slow-construction 
/2012/07/26/gJQATYEnDX_story.html. 
19 Id. 
20 Application of TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, L.P. for a Presidential Permit (May 
4, 2012), available at http://keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/documents/organization/189504. 
pdf; Office of the Spokesperson, New Pipeline Application Received from TransCanada, 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (May 4, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps /2012/05/189300. 
htm. 
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the outcome of this project has been politically predetermined, it is 
unclear whether there is any genuine intent to do so. 
Keystone XL would be the largest pipeline connecting the 
Canadian oil sands to the United States and “would open a new 
market on the Gulf Coast,” leading to increased oil sands production 
in Canada, which in turn would cumulatively increase greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions above levels that already threaten human health and 
welfare.21 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) confirms the 
existence of a “reasonably close causal relationship between issuing a 
cross-border permit for the Keystone XL project and increased 
extraction of oil sands crude in Canada intended to supply the 
pipeline” and urges the State Department to consider the increased 
GHG emissions from additional production in Canada.22 The EPA 
also underscores the importance of considering the fact that 
“[e]xtraction and refining of Canadian oil sands crude are GHG-
intensive relative to other types of crude oil.”23 
Because the proposed Keystone XL project would drive increased 
oil sands production, the increased GHG emissions and resulting 
climate change impacts are effects that the State Department must 
consider in its environmental review of the proposed project under 
NEPA. However, in its Final Environmental Impact Statement, the 
State Department concluded that the project would not result in 
increased GHG emissions from additional oil sands extraction and 
refining in Canada.24 This conclusion is based on the speculative 
assumption that GHG impacts from future projects would displace 
similar impacts from the proposed pipeline if it were not built, thus 
global emissions would remain the same, a speculation prohibited by 
NEPA.25 To further complicate matters, the State Department’s 
	
21 DANIELLE DROITSCH, PEMBINA INST., THE LINK BETWEEN KEYSTONE XL AND 
CANADIAN OILSANDS PRODUCTION 1–2 (Apr. 2011), available at http://pubs.pembina.org 
/reports/kxl-production-backgrounder-pembina.pdf. 
22 Letter from Cynthia Giles, EPA, to Jose W. Fernandez & Kerri-Ann Jones, U.S. 
Dep’t of State, at 3 (July 16, 2010) [hereinafter EPA Letter on DEIS], available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/oeca/webeis.nsf/(PDFView)/20100126/$file/20100126.PDF (“Not 
only will this pipeline transport large volumes of oil sands crude for at least fifty years 
from a known, dedicated source in Canada to refineries in the Gulf Coast, there are no 
significant current export markets for this crude oil other than the U.S. Accordingly, it is 
reasonable to conclude that extraction will likely increase if the pipeline is constructed.”). 
23 Id. at 2. 
24 See discussion infra section II.A.2. 
25 See discussion infra section II.A.2. 
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limited resources and overreliance on third-party contractors limited 
its ability to conduct a fully transparent environmental review.26 
This Article considers whether NEPA is an appropriate tool to 
address GHG and climate change impacts from projects such as 
Keystone XL and whether public participation and access to 
information under NEPA have been meaningful and effective in 
integrating global climate change concerns into the State 
Department’s environmental review of the proposed Keystone XL 
pipeline. NEPA regulations and relevant case law establish that the 
State Department has an obligation under NEPA to fully and 
transparently disclose, analyze, and consider GHG impacts of any 
additional oil sands production caused by the proposed Keystone XL 
pipeline—an obligation it has not fulfilled. The State Department’s 
overreliance on third-party contractors and failure to disclose and 
consider issues of fundamental concern to the public thwart the 
effectiveness of public participation under NEPA and give the 
impression that the decision to issue a permit for the pipeline has been 
politically predetermined, making NEPA review compulsory but not 
meaningful. Finally, this Article addresses whether public 
involvement under the NEPA-mandated process is meaningful 
compared to other forms of public participation and access to 
information apart from NEPA. 
I 
NEPA CAN BE USED TO ADDRESS GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
Under NEPA, federal agencies must “recognize the worldwide and 
long-range character of environmental problems,” which would 
presumably include global climate change.27 NEPA provides the legal 
framework for public participation and access to information in the 
State Department’s environmental review and decision-making 
process regarding whether to permit the proposed Keystone XL 
pipeline. As “our basic national charter for protection of the 
environment,”28 NEPA presumes an informed and involved public 
and requires agencies to “[m]ake diligent efforts to involve the public 
	
26 See discussion infra section II.A.3. 
27 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F) (2012). 
28 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (2012). 
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in preparing and implementing their NEPA procedures.”29 NEPA 
further requires full disclosure of “high quality” environmental 
information to both public officials and citizens “before decisions are 
made and before actions are taken,” emphasizing that “[a]ccurate 
scientific analysis, expert agency comments, and public scrutiny are 
essential to implementing NEPA.”30 The process mandated under 
NEPA “is intended to help public officials make decisions that are 
based on [an] understanding of environmental consequences, and take 
actions that protect, restore, and enhance the environment.”31 This 
section discusses relevant regulations, case law, and guidance to help 
delineate the State Department’s obligations under NEPA to fully 
disclose, analyze, and consider the impacts of GHG emissions and 
climate change from the proposed Keystone XL pipeline. 
A. Overview of NEPA Requirements 
NEPA requires all federal government agencies to prepare an 
environmental impact statement (EIS) for “major Federal actions 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”32 The 
Council on Environmental Quality’s (CEQ)33 NEPA regulations 
	
29 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(a) (2012); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(d) (2012) (“Federal 
agencies shall to the fullest extent possible . . . [e]ncourage and facilitate public 
involvement.”). 
30 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (emphasis added). 
31 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c). While NEPA “contains ‘action-forcing’ provisions to make 
sure that federal agencies act according to the letter and spirit of the Act,” 40 C.F.R. § 
1500.1(a), NEPA is only a procedural law requiring a certain process intended to prevent 
uninformed decisions and does not impose substantive duties mandating particular results. 
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989). The EIS 
requirement “serves NEPA’s ‘action-forcing’ purpose in two important respects. . . . It 
ensures that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, and will carefully 
consider, detailed information concerning significant environmental impacts; it also 
guarantees that the relevant information will be made available to the larger audience that 
may also play a role in both the decisionmaking process and the implementation of that 
decision.” Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. at 349. 
32 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). The environmental assessment (EA) is the primary tool 
agencies use to determine whether the preparation of an EIS is required by NEPA. 40 
C.F.R. §§ 1501.3, 1501.4, 1508.9 (2012). If the agency determines that an EIS is not 
required, the agency must then prepare a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI). 40 
C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(e), 1508.13. 
33 NEPA created the Council on Environmental Quality, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2)(C), 4342 
(2012), which has promulgated regulations detailing the procedures necessary for NEPA 
compliance, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1518 (2012). These regulations are “binding on all Federal 
agencies.” 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3. 
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require the EIS to include a “full and fair discussion” of the 
significance of all “direct,” “indirect,” and “cumulative” 
environmental impacts of the proposed action and all reasonable 
alternatives to the proposed action.34 In considering indirect and 
cumulative impacts, federal agencies must consider any delayed or 
incremental impacts that are “reasonably foreseeable”—such as 
climate change caused by GHG emissions.35 In 1997, CEQ issued 
guidance confirming the applicability of NEPA to transboundary 
impacts, clarifying that NEPA requires federal agencies to analyze 
reasonably foreseeable effects of proposed actions in the United 
States, regardless of whether those impacts might occur outside the 
country.36 
NEPA requires full disclosure of “high quality” environmental 
information, and the scientific accuracy of the discussions and 
analyses in the EIS and methodologies utilized must be sound and 
transparent.37 Further, NEPA urges a precautionary approach when 
there is “incomplete or unavailable information” regarding reasonably 
foreseeable adverse environmental effects on the human environment, 
	
34 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.1, 1502.16(a)–(b), 1508.25(c). Courts have found that, in the 
NEPA process, “the agency must take a ‘hard look’ at the impacts of its action by 
providing a reasonably thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the probable 
environmental consequences.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic 
Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1194 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation and quotation omitted); see 
also Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983). The 
Supreme Court has held that these impacts must be analyzed under NEPA when there is 
“‘a reasonably close causal relationship’ between the environmental effect and the alleged 
cause.” Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004) (quoting Metro. Edison 
Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983)). 
35 CEQ’s NEPA regulations define “[i]ndirect effects” as those that “are caused by the 
action and are later in time or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably 
foreseeable” and “may include . . . effects related to induced changes . . . on air and water 
and other natural systems, including ecosystems.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b). “Cumulative 
impact” is defined as “the impact on the environment which results from the incremental 
impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future 
actions regardless of what agency . . . or person undertakes such other actions.” 40 C.F.R. 
§ 1508.7. 
36 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, GUIDANCE ON NEPA ANALYSES FOR 
TRANSBOUNDARY IMPACTS ¶¶ 4, 6 (July 1, 1997), available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa 
/regs/transguide.html; see also Gov’t of the Province of Man. v. Salazar, 691 F. Supp. 2d 
37, 51 (D.D.C. 2010) (relying on the CEQ Guidance and holding that defendants were 
required to consider the Canadian impacts of their U.S. water supply project). 
37 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1(b), 1502.24. 
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including catastrophic consequences with a low probability of 
occurring.38 
When multiple agencies are involved in the proposed action, a 
“lead agency” will be designated to supervise the preparation of the 
EIS.39 However, continued participation and cooperation of all 
involved agencies, state and local governments, and the public early 
in and throughout the NEPA process is required.40 Public hearings or 
meetings must be held by agencies when there is “[s]ubstantial 
environmental controversy concerning the proposed action or 
substantial interest in holding the hearing” and when a cooperating 
agency requests a hearing.41 
After issuing a draft EIS (DEIS) and prior to preparing a final EIS 
(FEIS), the agency must “affirmatively solicit[] comments from those 
persons or organizations who may be interested or affected.”42 The 
agency is also required to “consult with and obtain the comments of 
any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise 
with respect to any environmental impact involved.”43 In the FEIS, 
the agency must consider and respond to all comments by either 
modifying the EIS or “[e]xplain[ing] why the comments do not 
warrant further agency response, citing the sources, authorities, or 
reasons which support the agency’s position and, if appropriate, 
indicate those circumstances which would trigger agency reappraisal 
	
38 CEQ NEPA regulations require that “[w]hen an agency is evaluating reasonably 
foreseeable significant adverse effects on the human environment in an environmental 
impact statement and there is incomplete or unavailable information, the agency shall 
always make clear that such information is lacking.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (2012). “For the 
purposes of this section, ‘reasonably foreseeable’ includes impacts which have 
catastrophic consequences, even if their probability of occurrence is low, provided that the 
analysis of the impacts is supported by credible scientific evidence, is not based on pure 
conjecture, and is within the rule of reason.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b). 
39 40 C.F.R. § 1501.5(a) (2012). 
40 40 C.F.R. § 1501.6 (2012) (A cooperating agency is any other federal agency other 
than a lead agency, which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise relevant to the 
proposed action.); 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2012). 
41 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(c) (2012); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(b) (2012) (Agencies must 
“provide public notice of NEPA-related hearings, public meetings, and the availability of 
environmental documents so as to inform those persons and agencies who may be 
interested or affected.”). 
42 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1(a) (2012). 
43 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(v) (2012); see also Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1123 
(10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1030 
(2d Cir. 1983)). 
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or further response.”44 After the FEIS is released, an agency must 
prepare a “concise public record of decision” that states what the 
agency’s decision is, all of the alternatives that the agency considered, 
whether all practicable means to avoid or minimize harms from the 
decision have been adopted, and if not, why not.45 
B. NEPA Jurisprudence Requires the State Department to Address 
GHG Emissions and Global Climate Change 
In 1996, a U.S. Court of Appeals recognized that the “new and 
potentially catastrophic environmental phenomenon” of global 
climate change “fits squarely within the broad NEPA framework.”46 
In the following cases, courts require consideration of increased GHG 
emissions and climate change impacts under NEPA. 
1. Border Power Plant Working Group v. Department of Energy 
In Border Power Plant Working Group v. Department of Energy, 
the court held that the defendants were required to consider the 
transboundary impacts, and thus carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, of 
gas-fired turbines in Mexico in their EIS on whether to permit 
electricity transmission lines within the United States that would cross 
the U.S.-Mexico border and allow the importation of electricity from 
power plants sited in Mexico.47 The threshold question in Border 
Power Plant was whether the operation of and emissions from the 
power turbines in Mexico were causally linked to—i.e., “effects” of—
the transmission lines and thus within the scope of the environmental 
	
44 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4(a) (2012); see Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. 
Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 537 (8th Cir. 2003) (The “agency preparing an FEIS [has] the duty to 
assess, consider, and respond to all comments.”); Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. 
Gribble, 565 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1977) (“The relevant questions under the NEPA are 
whether such comments are made available to decision-makers, whether the differences of 
opinion are readily apparent, and whether they receive good faith attention from decision-
makers.” (emphasis added)). 
45 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2 (2012). 
46 City of L.A. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478, 492 (D.C. Cir. 
1990), overruled on other grounds by Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996). In a 2011 article reviewing case law under NEPA related to GHG emissions 
and climate change, the author concludes that “[t]he primary commonality throughout all 
of the cases is that effects from various projects on climate change do fit within the rubric 
of NEPA.” Robert Reiley, The Evolution of NEPA in the Fight Against Climate Change, 5 
PITT. J. ENVTL. PUB. HEALTH L. 1, 38 (2011). 
47 Border Plant Working Grp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 260 F. Supp. 2d 997 (S.D. Cal. 
2003). The court found organizational standing for a group with U.S. and Mexican citizens 
who lived near the power plants and transmission lines in question. Id. at 1010–11. 
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review required by NEPA.48 For the turbines producing electricity 
primarily for export to the United States, the court found that the 
transmission lines were the only “current means” evidenced by the 
record through which the turbines could transmit power, and the 
turbines and transmission lines were “two links in the same chain.”49 
Thus, the emissions resulting from the operation of those turbines 
were “effects” of the transmission lines and must be analyzed under 
NEPA.50 The court also concluded that the Environmental 
Assessment (EA) was inadequate as a matter of law because it did not 
disclose and analyze the significance of the potential environmental 
impacts of the power plants’ CO2 emissions, including climate 
change, that were indicated in the record.51 
2. Mid States Coalition for Progress v. Surface Transportation Board 
In Mid States Coalition for Progress v. Surface Transportation 
Board, the court found that the proposed project to construct and 
upgrade rail lines to reach coal mines would likely result in an 
increase of CO2 emissions due to the increased availability of 
inexpensive coal to power plants.52 Thus, the Board was required 
under NEPA to evaluate the effects of the project, including an 
increase in the long-term demand for coal and the effects from 
burning the coal, e.g., CO2 emissions and climate change.53 The court 
stated that NEPA requires federal agencies to consider “any adverse 
environmental effects,” which under the CEQ regulations includes 
both direct and indirect effects.54 In response to the railroad’s 
assertion that effects of any increased coal use were speculative, the 
court reasoned that while the extent of the effect may be speculative, 
the nature of the effect was not; therefore, the agency could “not 
simply ignore the effect.”55 The court stated that “it is reasonably 
foreseeable—indeed, it is almost certainly true—that the proposed 
	
48 Id. at 1012–16. 
49 Id. at 1017. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 1028–29. 
52 Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520 (8th Cir. 2003). 
53 Id. at 549. 
54 Id. (quoting and citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8). 
55 Mid States Coal., 345 F.3d at 549. 
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project will increase the long-term demand for coal and any adverse 
effects that result from burning coal,” including climate change.56 
The court cited the specific procedure under CEQ regulations for 
“‘evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverse effects on the 
human environment’ when ‘there is incomplete or unavailable 
information.’”57 The court then stated the Board had for the most part 
“completely ignored the effects of increased coal consumption,” an 
impact raised in the public comments submitted on the DEIS, and that 
it “made no attempt to fulfill the requirements laid out in the CEQ 
regulations.”58 The court concluded that “it would be irresponsible for 
the Board to approve a project of this scope [and cost] without first 
examining the effects that may occur as a result of the reasonably 
foreseeable increase in coal consumption.”59 
3. Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway 
Transportation Safety Administration 
In Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway 
Transportation Safety Administration, the Center for Biological 
Diversity challenged the National Highway Transportation Safety 
Administration’s (NHTSA) final rule on fuel economy standards for 
light trucks, model years 2008–2011, under the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act (EPCA) and NEPA.60 Regarding the EPCA climate 
change claim, the court concluded that the failure to monetize benefits 
from reductions in CO2 emissions was arbitrary and capricious.61 The 
court also concluded that “EPCA does not limit NHTSA’s duty under 
NEPA to assess the environmental impacts, including the impact on 
climate change, of its rule”62 and that “[a]lthough NEPA does not 
demand substantive environmental outcomes . . . NHTSA clearly has 
statutory authority to . . . set higher standards if an EIS contained 
	
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 549–50 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22). 
58 Mid States Coal., 345 F.3d at 550. 
59 Id. Compare id. ($1.4 billion estimated cost of rail project in Mid States Coalition), 
with DOS FEIS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ES-2 (Aug. 26, 2011), available at http://keystone 
pipeline-xl.state.gov/documents/organization/182010.pdf ($7 billion estimated cost of 
Keystone XL). 
60 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 
1181 (9th Cir. 2008). 
61 Id. at 1200. 
62 Id. at 1214. 
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evidence that so warranted.”63 The court found that “the [fuel 
economy] standard will affect the level of the nation’s greenhouse gas 
emissions and impact global warming.”64 
The court determined that the EA had not adequately considered 
the possible consequences of the proposed agency action in 
concluding that the action would have no significant impact on the 
environment.65 Specifically, the court concluded that the EA’s 
analysis of the cumulative impacts of GHG emissions on climate 
change and the environment was inadequate.66 The court noted “the 
fact that climate change is largely a global phenomenon that includes 
actions that are outside of the agency’s control does not release the 
agency from the duty of assessing the effects of its actions on global 
warming within the context of other actions that also affect global 
warming.”67 The court concluded that “[t]he impact of greenhouse gas 
emissions on climate change is precisely the kind of cumulative 
impacts analysis that NEPA requires agencies to conduct.”68 
The court further concluded that NHTSA’s Finding of No 
Significant Impact was arbitrary and capricious, because “NHTSA’s 
EA shunted aside significant questions with merely conclusory 
statements, failed to directly address substantial questions, and most 
	
63 Id. at 1213. “This court has recognized that ‘NEPA’s legislative history reflects 
Congress’s concern that agencies might attempt to avoid any compliance with NEPA by 
narrowly construing other statutory directives to create a conflict with NEPA. Section 
102(2) of NEPA therefore requires government agencies to comply ‘to the fullest extent 
possible.’” Id. (quoting Forelaws on Bd. v. Johnson, 743 F.2d 677, 683 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
64 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1214. “NHTSA does not dispute that light 
trucks account for a significant percentage of the U.S. transportation sector, that the U.S. 
transportation sector accounts for about six percent of the world’s greenhouse gases, and 
that ‘fuel economy improvements could have a significant impact on the rate of CO2 
accumulation in the atmosphere,’ which would affect climate change.” Id. “[T]here is no 
doubt that the fuel economy standards set by NHTSA will have a direct effect on 
greenhouse gas emissions from light trucks-and that NHTSA is thus a ‘legally relevant 
cause.’” Id. n.68 (citation omitted). 
65 Id. at 1215. 
66 Id. at 1216 (“While the EA quantifies the expected amount of CO2 emitted from light 
trucks MYs 2005–2011, it does not evaluate the ‘incremental impact’ that these emissions 
will have on climate change or on the environment more generally in light of other past, 
present, and reasonably foreseeable actions such as other light truck and passenger 
automobile CAFE standards. The EA does not discuss the actual environmental effects 
resulting from those emissions or place those emissions in context of other CAFE 
rulemakings.”). 
67 Id. at 1217 (quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted). 
68 Id. at 1217. 
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importantly, provided no foundation for the important inference 
NHTSA draws between a decrease in the rate of carbon emissions 
growth and its finding of no significant impact.”69 Moreover, the EA 
did not provide a “convincing statement of reasons” for its finding of 
no significant impact, e.g., “the EA discusses the amount of CO2 
emissions expected from the Rule, but does not discuss the potential 
impact of such emissions on climate change.”70 
As these three case studies illustrate, the indirect impacts of GHG 
emissions and the cumulative impacts of global climate change 
clearly fall within the scope of impacts agencies are required to 
disclose, analyze, and consider in reviewing a proposed project under 
NEPA. 
C. CEQ’s Draft NEPA Guidance Further Demonstrates that the 
Effects of GHG Emissions and Climate Change Must Be 
Considered in the EIS 
In February 2010, CEQ issued “Draft NEPA Guidance on 
Consideration of the Effects of Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions.”71 According to CEQ, NEPA’s EIS requirement has two 
purposes. “First, it is meant to promote transparency and to ensure 
	
69 Id. at 1223–24 (quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
70 Id. at 1223 (“In the ‘Affected Environment’ section of the EA, NHTSA states that 
‘[i]ncreasing concentrations of greenhouse gases are likely to accelerate the rate of climate 
change.’ The agency notes that ‘[t]he transportation sector is a significant source of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, accounting for approximately 28 percent of all 
greenhouse gas emissions in the United States.’ From this, NHTSA jumps to the 
conclusion that ‘[c]oupled with the effects resulting from the 2003 light truck rule, the 
effects resulting from the agency’s current action are expected to lessen the GHG impacts 
discussed above.’” (citations omitted)); see also id. at 1220 (“‘If an agency decides not to 
prepare an EIS, it must supply a ‘convincing statement of reasons’ to explain why a 
project’s impacts are insignificant. ‘The statement of reasons is crucial to determining 
whether the agency took a ‘hard look’ at the potential environmental impact of a project.’ 
NHTSA’s EA is markedly deficient in its attempt to justify the refusal to prepare a 
complete EIS. . . . [T]he agency’s FONSI is based primarily on its conclusory assertion—
contradicted by evidence in the record—that the Final Rule will have no significant 
environmental impact because it authorizes CAFE standards that will result in a very small 
decrease in carbon dioxide emissions.” (citations omitted)). 
71 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, DRAFT NEPA GUIDANCE ON CONSIDERATION OF 
THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS (Feb. 18, 2010), 
available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/Consideration_of_Effects_of_GHG_Draft_ 
NEPA_Guidance_FINAL_02182010.pdf. The purpose of the draft guidance is to help 
explain how federal agencies should, in their NEPA review of a proposed agency action, 
disclose and analyze the environmental effects of GHG emissions and climate change. Id. 
at 1. The guidance recognizes that “[i]t is now well established that rising global GHG 
emissions are significantly affecting the Earth’s climate.” Id. at 10. 
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public accountability of agency decisions with significant 
environmental effects. . . . Second, it is meant to ensure that agencies 
take account of those effects before decisions are made and as part of 
the agency’s own decision-making process.”72 The draft guidance 
concludes: 
With the purpose of informing decision-making, CEQ proposes that 
the NEPA process should incorporate consideration of both the 
impact of an agency action on the environment through the 
mechanism of GHG emissions and the impact of changing climate 
on that agency action. This is not intended as a “new” component of 
NEPA analysis, but rather as a potentially important factor to be 
considered within the existing NEPA framework. Where an agency 
determines that an assessment of climate issues is appropriate, the 
agency should identity alternative actions that are both adapted to 
anticipated climate change impacts and mitigate the GHG emissions 
that cause climate change.73 
NEPA regulations, applicable case law, and CEQ’s draft NEPA 
guidance demonstrate that the State Department has an obligation 
under NEPA to fully and transparently disclose whether the proposed 
Keystone XL pipeline will increase oil sands production in Canada, 
analyze the resulting GHG and climate change effects, and consider 
those effects in its environmental review and decision-making 
process. 
II 
THE STATE DEPARTMENT MINIMIZED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION REGARDING CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE 
KEYSTONE XL NEPA REVIEW PROCESS 
This section assesses whether public participation and access to 
information in the NEPA-mandated environmental review of 
Keystone XL has been meaningful and effective by looking at 
whether the State Department fully and transparently disclosed, 
analyzed, and considered the reasonably foreseeable impacts of the 
proposed pipeline related to increased GHG emissions and climate 
change. Because the State Department refused to disclose and 
consider the GHG and climate change effects of increased oil sands 
production in Canada, public involvement in the NEPA process was 
	
72 Id. at 9. 
73 Id. at 11. 
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thwarted. As a point of comparison to gauge how meaningful and 
effective the public involvement has been, this section also briefly 
looks at other forms of public participation and access to information 
outside of NEPA. 
A. The State Department’s NEPA Process for Keystone XL Lacks 
Transparency and Sidesteps Climate Change Concerns 
Serving as the lead federal agency74 for the environmental review 
of the proposed pipeline under NEPA, the State Department (through 
its contractor) prepared an EIS as part of the Presidential Permit 
review process.75 The DEIS was issued in April 2010, and in response 
to comments on the DEIS, the State Department developed a 
Supplemental DEIS (SDEIS), which was issued in April 2011.76 
Comments from the public and the EPA assert multiple inadequacies 
in the DEIS and SDEIS related to the State Department’s failure to 
	
74 The following agencies are cooperating agencies in the Keystone XL NEPA process: 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; U.S. Department of the Interior–Bureau of Land 
Management, National Park Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service; U.S. Department of 
Agriculture–Natural Resources Conservation Service, Farm Service Agency, Rural 
Utilities Service; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; U.S. Department of Energy–Office of 
Policy and International Affairs, Western Area Power Administration; U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Office of 
Pipeline Safety; Montana Department of Environmental Quality. DOS FEIS, 
INTRODUCTION, supra note 14, at 1-12 to 1-17. 
75 Id. at 1 (Applications for Presidential Permits are received and considered by the 
State Department for oil pipeline border crossings and associated facilities such as the 
proposed Keystone XL project, “pursuant to the President’s constitutional authority over 
foreign relations, and as Commander-in-Chief, which authority the President delegated to 
DOS in Executive Order (EO) 13337. . . . DOS jurisdiction to issue a Presidential Permit 
includes only the border crossing and the associated facilities at the border. DOS authority 
over the border crossing does not include the legal authority to regulate petroleum 
pipelines within the U.S. The Department of Transportation’s Pipelines and Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) is responsible for promulgating regulations 
regarding issues of petroleum pipeline construction, operation, and maintenance. 
Individual states have the legal authority to approve petroleum pipeline construction in 
their states, including selecting the routes for such pipelines. Different states have made 
different choices in how or whether to exercise that authority. Some states, such as 
Montana, have chosen to grant the authority to a state agency to approve pipeline routes 
through that state. Other states, such as Nebraska, have chosen not to grant any state 
agency such authority. In preparation of this EIS, DOS has consulted extensively with 
those federal and state agencies that possess regulatory authority over petroleum pipelines, 
as well as local, state, tribal and federal agencies that have jurisdiction with particular 
expertise regarding evaluating potential impacts of the proposed Project.”); see also 
Issuance of Permits With Respect to Certain Energy-Related Facilities and Land 
Transportation Crossings on the International Boundaries of the United States, Exec. Order 
No. 13,337, as amended 69 Fed. Reg. 25,299 (Apr. 30, 2004). 
76 DOS FEIS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 59, at ES-2-ES-3. 
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disclose and consider GHG emissions from additional oil sands 
mining in Canada. In the FEIS, issued in August 2011, the State 
Department denied that the Keystone XL pipeline will result in any 
additional oil sands extraction and production in Canada, and based 
this finding on the speculative assumption that other oil transport 
projects would be built in the future that would lead to a similar 
increase in oil sands production if the pipeline was not permitted.77 
This conclusion ignores the expertise of the EPA and appears to be in 
direct contradiction with NEPA regulations and case law discussed in 
the previous section. 
Following the publication of the FEIS, the State Department must 
determine whether the proposed project serves the national interest. 
This is referred to as a “national interest determination” and is 
separate from the NEPA environmental review process.78 As 
mentioned in the introduction, the State Department was forced to 
deny the permit in response to an arbitrary deadline set by Congress, 
and TransCanada reapplied for the permit in May 2012. In June 2012, 
the State Department issued a public notice of its intent to prepare a 
supplemental EIS (SEIS) for the proposed Keystone XL pipeline.79 
1. Comments from the Public and EPA on the DEIS and SDEIS Assert 
Inadequacies in Failing to Disclose and Consider GHG 
Emissions from Additional Oil Sands Mining in Canada 
Nearly 1,800 written and oral comments were submitted on the 
DEIS.80 The State Department prepared consolidated responses to 
issues raised by multiple commenters, including “Concerns Regarding 
Greenhouse Gas Lifecycle Analyses” and “Concerns Regarding a 
	
77 See discussion infra section II.A.2. 
78 DOS FEIS, INTRODUCTION, supra note 14, at 1-4. The State Department held 
meetings along the pipeline route to “give individuals an opportunity to voice their views 
on whether granting or denying a Presidential Permit for the pipeline would be in the 
national interest and to comment on economic, energy security, environmental and safety 
issues relevant to that determination.” Id. at 1-26. See also Exec. Order No. 13,337, supra 
note 75, at 25,300. 
79 Notice of Intent To Prepare a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) 
and To Conduct Scoping and To Initiate Consultation Under Section 106 of the National 
Historic Preservation Act for the Proposed TransCanada Keystone XL Pipeline, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 36,032 (June 15, 2012). 
80 DOS FEIS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 59, at ES-2; see DOS FEIS, 
APPENDIX A, DRAFT EIS COMMENT MATRIX (Aug. 26, 2011), available at http:// 
keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/documents/organization/182118.pdf. 
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Potential Causal Connection of Implementation of the Proposed 
Project and Expanded Oil Sands Production in Alberta and Increases 
in Refining in the Gulf Coast.”81 Large environmental organizations 
submitted joint comments on behalf of their members alleging 
procedural concerns regarding public participation.82 The comments 
also substantively asserted that the DEIS did not adequately disclose, 
analyze, and consider the direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of 
the Keystone XL pipeline, including impacts from GHG emissions 
and climate change.83 
The EPA raised similar concerns in its review of the DEIS and 
gave it the lowest possible rating of adequacy, “Category 3-
Inadequate Information.”84 The EPA’s July 2010 letter to the State 
Department asserted that the DEIS “does not provide the scope or 
detail of analysis necessary to fully inform decision makers and the 
public, and recommend[ed] that additional information and analysis 
be provided.”85 The EPA recommended “that the discussion of GHG 
emissions be expanded to include, in particular, an estimate of the 
extraction-related GHG emissions associated with long-term 
importation of large quantities of oil sands crude from a dedicated 
source.”86 The EPA also emphasized the “causal relationship between 
. . . the Keystone XL project and increased extraction of oil sands 
crude in Canada intended to supply that pipeline.”87 
	
81 DOS FEIS, CONSOLIDATED RESPONSES TO COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT EIS AND THE 
SUPPLEMENTAL DRAFT EIS FOR THE PROPOSED KEYSTONE XL PROJECT A-41-A-44 
(Aug. 26, 2011) [hereinafter CONSOLIDATED RESPONSES], available at http://keystone 
pipeline-xl.state.gov/documents/organization/182120.pdf. 
82 EARTHJUSTICE, NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, W. ORG. OF RES. COUNCILS, NATURAL 
RES. DEF. COUNCIL, PLAINS JUSTICE, & SIERRA CLUB, PUBLIC COMMENTS OF THE 
SIERRA CLUB, ET AL., ON THE TRANSCANADA KEYSTONE XL PIPELINE DRAFT 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 9-11 (July 2, 2010), available at http:// 
docs.nrdc.org/energy/files/ene_10070201a.pdf. Specifically, “short notice before public 
meetings and the remote locations hindered meaningful public participation,” and “[t]he 
Scoping process was also defective because the Department of State Notice of Intent 
(“NOI”) failed to disclose all federal actions that are subject to NEPA review.” Id. at 9. 
83 Id. at 57–67. These comments also requested a stay of the decision to address 
pending matters, including the need to finalize CEQ’s draft NEPA guidance on climate 
change and GHG emissions before the Keystone XL EIS is finalized. Id. at 7. 
84  EPA Letter on DEIS, supra note 22, at 7. 
85 Id. at 1. 
86 Id. at 2. 
87 Id. at 3. 
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In response to comments on the DEIS, the State Department 
developed a SDEIS, which generated over 280,000 comments,88 many 
of which raised similar climate change-related concerns.89 Large 
environmental organizations submitted joint comments stressing the 
need for further public participation, stating that the State Department 
“seems determined to limit meaningful participation and allow this 
project to proceed as soon as possible” and that the Department’s 
“process violates the letter and intent of NEPA’s public participation 
requirements.”90 Additionally, the commenters asserted that the 
SDEIS is inadequate under NEPA because it fails to analyze 
transboundary impacts, including impacts of lifecycle GHG 
emissions, despite evidence in the record that shows a clear 
connection between the proposed Keystone XL pipeline and increased 
oil sands production.91 The commenters further criticized the SDEIS’s 
analysis of GHG emissions as “insufficient and flawed” because of its 
incorrect conclusions that additional extraction of oil sands in Canada 
is not an indirect impact of Keystone XL and that the proposed 
pipeline will not affect GHG emissions globally.92 The commenters 
also alleged that the SDEIS does not adequately analyze and consider 
the impacts of all connected actions, as required under NEPA, 
including reasonably foreseeable increased domestic oil production 
	
88 DOS FEIS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 59, at ES-3; see DOS FEIS, 
APPENDIX A, SUPPLEMENTAL DRAFT EIS COMMENT MATRIX (Aug. 26, 2011), available 
at http://keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/documents/organization/182117.pdf. 
89 The consolidated responses prepared by the State Department were in response to 
comments on both the DEIS and the SDEIS. See DOS FEIS, CONSOLIDATED RESPONSES, 
supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
90 SIERRA CLUB, SIERRA CLUB NEB. CHAPTER, NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, NATURAL 
RES. DEF. COUNCIL, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, W. ORG. OF RES. COUNCILS, 
FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS, CORPORATE ETHICS INT’L, 
INDIGENOUS ENVTL. NETWORK, CLEAN AIR & WATER, GLOBAL COMMUNITY MONITOR, 
CTR. FOR ENERGY MATTERS, BIG THICKET ASS’N, & STOP TARSANDS OIL PIPELINES, 
COMMENTS OF THE SIERRA CLUB, ET AL., TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON THE 
SUPPLEMENTAL DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE TRANSCANADA 
KEYSTONE XL PIPELINE 2–3 (June 6, 2011), available at http://docs.nrdc.org/energy/ 
files/ene_11060701a.pdf. 
91 Id. at 40–52. “The transboundary impacts associated with Keystone XL [that] must 
be analyzed in an EIS include, but are not limited to: increased greenhouse gas emission 
associated with tar sands extraction, upgrading and transportation in Canada, including 
vast losses of boreal forest carbon sinks . . . .” Id. at 42. 
92 Id. at 52–55. 
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caused by other pipeline projects that would connect to Keystone 
XL.93 
The EPA reviewed and rated the SDEIS as “Environmental 
Objections – Insufficient Information (EO-2).”94 In its June 2011 
letter to the State Department, the EPA stated that “additional analysis 
is necessary to fully respond to our earlier comments and to ensure a 
full evaluation of the potential impacts of [the] proposed Project, and 
to identify potential means to mitigate those impacts,” including an 
“improve[ment of] the discussion of lifecycle greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHGs) associated with oil sands crude.”95 The EPA 
criticized the methodology used by the State Department as possibly 
“underestimat[ing] the values at the high-end of the ranges cited in 
the lifecycle GHG emissions discussion by approximately 20 
percent.”96 The EPA also reproved the conclusion in the SDEIS that 
“on a global scale, emissions are not likely to change” and 
recommended “against comparing GHG emissions associated with a 
single project to global GHG emission levels.”97 
  
	
93 Id. at 55–64; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1) (When agencies consider the scope 
of a proposed action, closely related “connected actions” must be considered in the same 
EIS.). 
94 Letter from Cynthia Giles, EPA, to Jose W. Fernandez & Kerri-Ann Jones, 
Department of State, at 8 (June 6, 2011) [hereinafter EPA Letter on SDEIS], available at 
http://www.eenews.net/assets/2011/ 06/07/document_gw_02.pdf. 
95 Id. at 1–2. 
96 Id. at 6. 
97 Id. (“Moreover, recognizing the proposed Project’s lifetime is expected to be at least 
fifty years, we believe it is important to be clear that under at least one scenario, the extra 
GHG emissions associated with this proposed Project may range from 600 million to 1.15 
billion tons CO2-e, assuming the lifecycle analysis holds over time (and using the SDEIS’ 
quantitative estimates as a basis). In addition, we recommend that the Final EIS explore 
other means to characterize the impact of the GHG emissions, including an estimate of the 
‘social costs of carbon’ associated with potential increases of GHG emissions [under EO 
12866]. The social cost of carbon includes, but is not limited to, climate damages due to 
changes in net agricultural productivity, human health, property damages from flood risk, 
and ecosystem services due to climate change. Federal agencies use the social cost of 
carbon to incorporate the social benefits of reducing CO2 emissions into analyses of 
regulatory actions that have a marginal impact on cumulative global emissions; the social 
cost of carbon is also used to calculate the negative impacts of regulatory actions that 
increase CO2 emissions.” (emphasis added)). 
BROWN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2013  10:02 AM 
2012] The Rights to Public Participation and Access to 521 
Information: Keystone XL Oil Sands Pipeline and Global Climate 
Change Under the National Environmental Policy Act 
2. The State Department’s Erroneous Conclusion that Keystone XL 
Will Cause Neither Additional Oil Sands Mining in Canada nor 
an Increase in Global GHG Emissions Is Based on Flawed 
Assumptions, Ignores Comments of the Public and EPA, and Is 
Contrary to NEPA 
In August 2011, only four months after the SDEIS was issued, the 
State Department issued its FEIS and responses to comments on the 
DEIS and SDEIS. In its FEIS, the State Department concluded that 
under most scenarios the proposed Project would not substantially 
influence the rate or magnitude of oil extraction activities in 
Canada, or the overall volume of crude oil transported to the United 
States or refined in the United States. Thus, from a global 
perspective, the decision whether or not to build the Project will not 
affect the extraction and combustion of WCSB [Western Canadian 
Sedimentary Basin] oil sands crude on the global market.98 
This conclusion is based solely on a report prepared by EnSys 
Energy, a company with many oil industry clients,99 and rests on the 
assumption that if Keystone XL is not built, alternative transportation 
projects would be developed that would similarly allow production of 
oil sands in Canada to continue at a similar rate through 2030.100 
	
98 DOS FEIS, CUMULATIVE IMPACTS, 3.14-52 (Aug. 26, 2011), available at 
http://keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/documents/organization/182069.pdf. 
99 About Us, ENSYS ENERGY, http://www.ensysenergy.com/about.php (last visited Oct. 
31, 2012) (EnSys’s energy clients include industry organizations such as American 
Petroleum Institute and OPEC Secretariat, and oil companies such as ConocoPhillips, 
Koch Industries, Exxon Mobil, BP, and Royal Dutch Shell). 
100 DOS FEIS, CUMULATIVE IMPACTS, supra note 98, at 3.14-62 (“‘Production levels 
of oil sands crudes would not be affected by whether or not KXL was built. WCSB 
production would only be impacted . . . if there were no further pipeline expansion out of 
WCSB and within the USA beyond projects currently under construction.’” (quoting DOS 
SDEIS, APPENDIX A, ENSYS REPORT: KEYSTONE XL ASSESSMENT 116 (Dec. 23, 2010) 
[hereinafter ENSYS REPORT], available at http://keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/182275.pdf.). The EnSys report assessed fourteen different scenarios 
considering seven different Canadian crude oil transportation scenarios and two separate 
supply and demand outlooks. “According to EnSys, all scenarios assessed resulted . . . in 
very similar U.S. refinery investments, expansions, throughputs, and thus total crude 
import levels, U.S. product import and export levels, U.S. import costs, U.S. and global 
refinery CO2 emissions and global life-cycle GHG emissions.’” DOS FEIS, CUMULATIVE 
IMPACTS, supra note 98, at 3.14-34. The EnSys report did find that under the “No 
Expansion Scenario,” there would be less cumulative refinery investments and throughputs 
and the quality of the crude would be higher than under the other scenarios. Id. at 3.14-34 
to 3.14-35 (quoting ENSYS REPORT at 47). However, the No Expansion Scenario was 
deemed “‘essentially implausible’” by EnSys; thus, “the total emissions would be similar  
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Further, this report disclaims “any legal liability or responsibility for 
the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information” in the 
report for the U.S. government or any agency thereof.101 
In spite of this questionable, if not incorrect, conclusion that there 
would be no additional oil sands production in Canada as a result of 
the proposed Keystone XL project,102 the State Department 
nonetheless provided information on indirect cumulative impacts and 
life-cycle GHG emissions from the proposed project “for illustrative 
purposes”103 and “as a matter of policy,”104 insisting that “a life-cycle 
analysis is not strictly necessary for purposes of evaluating the 
potential environmental impacts attributable to the proposed Project 
under NEPA.”105 In response to comments on the DEIS, the State 
Department hired a separate third-party contractor, ICF International, 
to conduct a detailed study of GHG life-cycle emissions comparing 
Canadian oil sands crude with other selected reference crude oils.106 
One of the report’s conclusions included: “WCSB crudes, as likely 
transported through the proposed Project, are on average more GHG-
intensive than the crudes they would displace in the United States.”107 
This conclusion was immediately dismissed in the report and the 
FEIS as essentially not relevant, due to the conclusion of the EnSys 
report that the proposed project will not “substantially influence” 
mining of oil sands in Canada; therefore, global GHG emissions will 
be unaffected by the proposed project.108 This conclusion blatantly 
ignores the EPA’s pertinent expertise and recommendation, in its 
	
with or without the proposed Project.” Id. at 3.14-35 (quoting DOS FEIS, APPENDIX V, 
ENSYS ENERGY, KEYSTONE XL ASSESSMENT–NO EXPANSION UPDATE 75 (Aug. 12, 
2011) [hereinafter ENSYS NO EXPANSION UPDATE], available at http://keystonepipeline-
xl.state.gov/documents/organization/182263.pdf). 
101 ENSYS REPORT, supra note 100, at iv. The report was commissioned by the 
Department of Energy in response to the concerns of many commenters regarding 
lifecycle GHG emissions of the oil sands originating in Alberta. DOS FEIS, 
CONSOLIDATED RESPONSES, supra note 81, at A-41 to A-43. 
102 See DROITSCH, supra note 21, at 1-2; EPA Letter on DEIS, supra note 22, at 3. 
103 DOS FEIS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 59, at ES-15. 
104 DOS FEIS, CUMULATIVE IMPACTS, supra note 98, at 3.14-61. 
105 Id. at 3.14-52. 
106 Id. at 3.14-44; see also DOS FEIS, CONSOLIDATED RESPONSES, supra note 81, at 
A-42. 
107 DOS FEIS, APPENDIX V: LIFE-CYCLE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS OF 
PETROLEUM PRODUCTS FROM WCSB OIL SANDS CRUDES COMPARED WITH REFERENCE 
CRUDES 48 (July 13, 2011) [hereinafter ICF REPORT], available at http://keystone 
pipeline-xl.state.gov/documents/ organization/182265.pdf  
108 Id.; DOS FEIS, CUMULATIVE IMPACTS, supra note 98, at 3.14-52. 
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comments on the SDEIS, that the State Department not “compar[e] 
GHG emissions associated with a single project to global GHG 
emission levels,” because global climate change is caused by 
numerous and varied sources, which each incrementally and 
cumulatively add to global atmospheric GHG concentrations.109 The 
State Department is not released “from the duty of assessing the 
effects of its actions on global warming within the context of other 
actions that also affect global warming” simply because “climate 
change is largely a global phenomenon that includes actions that are 
outside of [its] control.”110 
In response to concerns by commenters regarding a causal 
connection between Keystone XL and expanded oil sands production 
in Alberta, the State Department concluded that “[t]hese independent 
analyses [the EnSys and ICF reports] indicated that the degree and the 
rate of development of the Alberta oil sands is not sensitive to the 
proposed action assessed in the EIS and would occur whether or not 
the proposed Project is approved and implemented.”111 The State 
Department further concluded, relying on the EnSys report, that “the 
delivery of Canadian crude oil to the Gulf Coast region is not 
dependent on the presence or absence of the proposed project,” 
assuming that refineries would acquire crude from other sources 
outside of Canada and/or that alternative transportation methods 
would be found to deliver the Canadian crude.112 
Many of the criticisms of the SDEIS raised by environmental 
organizations and the EPA remain relevant for the FEIS.113 Indeed, 
	
109 EPA Letter on SDEIS, supra note 94, at 6; see also Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 
1123 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[A] reviewing court ‘may properly be skeptical as to whether an 
EIS’s conclusions have a substantial basis in fact if the responsible agency has apparently 
ignored the conflicting views of other agencies having pertinent expertise.’” (quoting 
Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1030 (2d Cir. 1983))). 
110 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 
1172, 1217 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
111 DOS FEIS, CONSOLIDATED RESPONSES, supra note 81, at A-43. 
112 Id. at A-44. 
113 While EnSys provided an update to the report prepared prior to the SDEIS, the State 
Department still relied primarily on the initial 2010 report in its FEIS. The 2011 update 
only strengthens the conclusions of the 2010 report. See ENSYS ENERGY NO EXPANSION 
UPDATE, supra note 100, at 75 (“As in our prior study, this update reaffirms our view that 
several pipeline options exist aside from Keystone XL to deliver WCSB crudes to market. 
. . . The update thus reinforces the view expressed in our Keystone XL Assessment report  
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the comments from Sierra Club et al. point out that the same 
conclusion based on the EnSys Report in both the SDEIS and FEIS—
that “even if the proposed action does not proceed, production from 
the oil sands in Canada would likely continue at a similar rate”114—
“is wrong, and is plainly contradicted by the data in the EnSys 
Report.”115 
[T]he EnSys Report’s conclusion—that KXL will not affect oil 
sands production levels—depends on the assumption that if KXL is 
not built, some other future oil transport project would be built that 
would similarly allow production to increase through 2030. . . . 
[N]one of these alternative projects are moving forward, and many 
have not yet been formally proposed.116 
The public comments clearly lay out why this flawed assumption is 
prohibited by NEPA, as it is based on the speculation that future 
projects would have similar impacts as the proposed project.117 In the 
Border Power Plant case, the court held that defendants were 
required to consider the transboundary impacts, including CO2 
emissions, of power turbines in Mexico because the transmission lines 
were the “only current means” through which the turbines could 
transmit power.118 Similarly, the proposed Keystone XL pipeline is 
the only current means to allow tar sands production to increase 
through 2030, and the possibility that future projects would be built 
	
that . . .  if [Keystone XL] were not built . . . then, over time, broadly comparable pipeline 
capacity would evolve.” (emphasis added)). 
114 DOS FEIS, CUMULATIVE IMPACTS, supra note 98, at 3.14-62. 
115 SIERRA CLUB ET AL., supra note 90, at 43; see also DROITSCH, supra note 21, at 9 
(“Significantly, the EnSys report acknowledges that production is constrained without 
Keystone XL, but not until 2030. One of its modeled scenarios, called No Expansion, 
demonstrates that without new pipelines, western Canadian crude production (largely 
oilsands) would be curtailed by 750,000–950,000 barrels per day by 2030. Under this 
scenario, oilsands production would be curtailed in the event that Keystone XL does not 
proceed, there is no expansion of pipeline capacity between PADD II and PADD III, and 
no pipelines to the West Coast proceed. According to the EnSys report, “A No Expansion 
scenario would have significant impacts on the disposition of WCSB crudes.” Despite this 
finding, EnSys concludes that Keystone XL would not affect production, largely because 
its analysis assumes that other pipeline projects to Asia and the Gulf Coast will move 
ahead. The EnSys conclusion is flawed. The potential for future transport projects that 
would similarly increase oilsands production does not negate the fact that Keystone XL 
would increase oilsands production.”).  
116 SIERRA CLUB ET AL., supra note 90 at 48. 
117 Id. 
118 Border Plant Working Grp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 260 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1017 (S.D. 
Cal. 2003). 
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that may have similar impacts does not change that fact.119 As in 
Border Power Plant, GHG emissions resulting from additional oil 
sands production in Canada are causally linked to the construction 
and operation of the pipeline and are therefore reasonably foreseeable 
indirect effects of the pipeline that the State Department has an 
obligation to disclose, analyze, and consider under NEPA.120 
In another analogous case, Mid States Coalition, the court stated 
that NEPA requires federal agencies to consider “any adverse 
environmental effects,” including both direct and indirect effects.121 
The same reasoning employed by the court in Mid States Coalition is 
applicable to the proposed Keystone XL project. The State 
Department relied on the speculative assumption that impacts from 
future projects would displace the impacts from the proposed 
pipeline. Without this assumption, “it is reasonably foreseeable—
indeed, it is almost certainly true—that the proposed project [by 
increasing the availability of oil sands crude to the market] will 
increase the long-term demand for [oil sands crude] and any adverse 
effects that result from” its production, including CO2 emissions and 
climate change.122 The State Department “has completely ignored” 
the reasonably foreseeable indirect effects of expanded oil sands 
production in Canada, including increased GHG emissions, a concern 
raised by both the public and the EPA in comments on the DEIS and 
SDEIS.123 
As in Center for Biological Diversity, a court could find that the 
proposed Keystone XL pipeline would increase GHG emissions and 
impact global climate change,124 and conclude that the State 
Department’s failure to disclose and analyze the cumulative impacts 
	
119 See id. 
120 See id.; see also COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 36, at ¶ 4 (“NEPA law 
directs federal agencies to analyze the effects of proposed actions to the extent they are 
reasonably foreseeable consequences of the proposed action, regardless of where those 
impacts might occur.”). 
121 Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 549 (8th Cir. 
2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
122 Id. (The author is applying the court’s reasoning in Mid States Coalition to the 
proposed Keystone XL project.); see also DROITSCH, supra note 21 and accompanying 
text; EPA Letter on DEIS, supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
123 Mid States Coal., 345 F.3d at 550; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (2012). 
124 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 
1172, 1214 (9th Cir. 2008); see supra note 2; DROITSCH, supra note 21, at 1-2; EPA Letter 
on DEIS, supra note 22, at 3. 
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of the GHG emissions on climate change resulting from additional oil 
sands production renders the EIS inadequate.125 The speculative 
assumption that some other future oil transport projects would be built 
with similar impacts to Keystone XL is needed to justify the State 
Department’s conclusion that the proposed pipeline would not result 
in increased production of Canadian oil sands, and thus global GHG 
emissions would remain the same. This assumption and resulting 
denial of the existence of the causal relationship between the 
proposed project and expanded oil sands production help demonstrate 
that the State Department likely did not take the requisite “‘hard look’ 
at the environmental consequences of the action as required by 
NEPA.”126 An oil industry, third-party contractor’s conclusion that 
“over time, broadly comparable pipeline capacity would evolve”127 
does not negate the reasonably foreseeable impacts of the proposed 
Keystone XL pipeline and does not allow the State Department to 
forgo its obligation under NEPA to disclose, analyze, and consider 
those impacts. While the public has had an opportunity to comment 
on the State Department’s EIS, they have been denied full and 
transparent disclosure of the effects of the proposed pipeline and 
could not therefore fully comment on those effects or weigh in on 
alternatives. Despite numerous, well-supported comments from the 
public and the EPA, the State Department’s refusal to fully disclose 
and consider the proposed pipeline’s indirect effects of increased oil 
sands production in Canada and the resulting cumulative effects on 
climate change has resulted in a clear hindrance of public 
participation and access to information in the Department’s NEPA 
process. In particular, for members of the public who rely upon the 
State Department’s EIS alone for information, the EIS withholds the 
kind of relevant analysis and disclosure that is required by NEPA and 
was requested by the EPA. 
3. Office of Inspector General Report Reveals Flaws in the State 
Department’s Keystone XL NEPA Review Process 
The State Department contracted a third party, Cardno Entrix, to 
perform the environmental review and draft the EIS on the proposed 
Keystone XL pipeline. This is allowed by NEPA if the contractor is 
“chosen solely by the lead agency” and the contractor “execute[s] a 
	
125 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1216. 
126 Id. at 1223–24 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
127  ENSYS NO EXPANSION UPDATE, supra note 100, at 75. 
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disclosure statement,” which “specif[ies] that they have no financial 
or other interest in the outcome of the project.”128 Yet the State 
Department allowed TransCanada, the proposed pipeline operator, to 
screen possible contractors to prepare the EIS and successfully 
recommend Cardno Entrix, despite the fact that TransCanada had 
financial ties with Cardno Entrix, which lists TransCanada as a 
“major client.”129 Further, Cardno Entrix’s disclosure statement 
appeared incomplete, as it did not mention a known project done for 
TransCanada.130 The National Interest Determination (NID) hearings 
held in September were also organized by Cardno Entrix, which 
accepted all of the public comments for the process.131 
These revelations, among others, led fourteen members of 
Congress, in October 2011, to request that the Office of Inspector 
General (OIG) at the State Department investigate the State 
Department’s handling of the EIS and NID for the proposed Keystone 
XL pipeline.132 
Given the significant economic, environmental, and public health 
implications of the proposed pipeline, we believe that it is critical 
that the State Department conduct thorough, unbiased reviews of 
the project. Further, it is imperative that the State Department 
process be free of actual or apparent conflicts of interest, and that 
the process fully meets both the letter and spirit of all federal laws, 
	
128 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5(c) (2012). 
129 Elisabeth Rosenthal & Dan Frosch, Pipeline Review Is Faced With Question of 
Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/08/science/earth/ 
08pipeline.html; see also Letter from Senators Bernard Sanders, Patrick Leahy, and Ron 
Wyden to Hillary Clinton, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of State (Oct. 14, 2011), available at 
http://sanders.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Document3.pdf; see also Letter from David S. 
Adams, Assistant Sec’y, Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Senator Bernard 
Sanders (Oct. 31, 2011), available at http://sanders.senate.gov/ imo/media/doc/state%20 
dept%20response.pdf. 
130 Supra note 129. 
131 Supra note 129. There were additional conflict of interest allegations over the State 
Department’s handling of the Keystone XL application because TransCanada’s chief 
Washington lobbyist was a top official in Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s 2008 
presidential campaign. Elisabeth Rosenthal, TransCanada Pipeline Foes See U.S. Bias in 
E-Mails, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/04/science/earth/04 
pipeline.html. 
132 Letter from Bernard Sanders et al., Members of Congress, to Honorable Harold W. 
Geisel, Office of Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t of State (Oct. 26, 2011), available at 
http://sanders.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/IG20%Letter%20FINAL.pdf.  
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including but not limited to the National Environmental Policy 
Act.133 
The request also asked for an examination of “the full scope of the 
State Department process related to the EIS and NID.”134 In 
particular, did the FEIS “fully incorporate the views and concerns of” 
the EPA in relation to “assessing the exacerbation of climate change 
due to increased greenhouse gas emissions from increased 
exploitation of tar sands oil?”135 In response to the congressional 
request, the OIG initiated a “special review” of the State 
Department’s handling of the EIS and NID,136 which was completed 
in February 2012.137 
The Inspector General’s report found that TransCanada did have 
influence over the selection of Cardno Entrix to perform the 
environmental review of TransCanada’s proposed project, but that 
this influence was inherent in “the third-party contracting process 
used by the Department.”138 The Inspector General warned that “[a]ny 
potential appearance of improper influence can lead the American 
public to question the Department’s independence and objectivity” 
and recommended “modify[ing] its third-party contracting process to 
reduce the appearance of improper influence,” to which the 
Department agreed.139 The report criticized the State Department for 
not reviewing and verifying Cardno Entrix’s organizational conflict of 
	
133 Id. The congressional request also asked: “Have all requests for materials related to 
the Keystone XL pipeline under the Freedom of Information Act been timely fulfilled so 
that the public has access to all the necessary documents and materials related to this 
project?” Id.; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5(c). 
134 Bernard Sanders et al., supra note 132. 
135 Id. 
136 Memorandum from Harold W. Geisel, on Special Review of the Keystone XL 
Pipeline Permit Process to William Burns, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of State (Nov. 4, 
2011), available at http://sanders.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Special%20Review%20Key 
stone%20XL%20Pipeline%20Nov%2020112.pdf (“The primary objective of the review is 
to determine to what extent the Department and all parties involved complied with Federal 
laws and regulations relating to the Keystone XL pipeline permit process.”). 
137 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE & THE BROAD. BD. OF GOVERNORS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR 
GEN., SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE KEYSTONE XL PIPELINE PERMIT PROCESS, Report No. 
AUD/SI-12-28 (2012) [hereinafter OIG REPORT], available at http://www.sanders.senate. 
gov/imo/media/doc/Keystone%20Final%20Report%20020912.pdf.  
138 Id. at 13. 
139 Id. at 13–14; see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR THE USE OF 
THIRD-PARTY CONTRACTORS IN PREPARATION OF ENVTL. DOCUMENTS  (2012), 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/190304.pdf. 
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interest materials, but concluded that the relationship between Cardno 
Entrix and TransCanada was not technically a conflict of interest.140 
The following finding in the report may provide an explanation for 
some of the inadequacies discussed above in the State Department’s 
NEPA review process: 
The Department’s limited technical resources, expertise, and 
experience impacted the implementation of the NEPA process. The 
Department had to rely more on outside parties, such as its third-
party contractor and other Federal agencies with expertise, to 
address issues related to alternatives and mitigation, pipeline safety, 
and environmental risks throughout the EIS process. As a result, 
OIG believes the EIS and related processes were less effective.141 
On a project that generated over 280,000 comments on the SDEIS and 
where there were only four months between the issuance of the 
SDEIS and the FEIS (including the comment period), the overreliance 
of the Department on outside parties, in particular third-party 
contractors, could not be more clear. Disturbingly, however, the 
inspector general somehow considered this issue resolved when the 
Department agreed to its recommendation to “fill at least one full-
time Civil Service position . . . with staff who have experience and 
expertise in handling [NEPA] issues and the [EIS] process.”142 
Regarding the question of whether the State Department had failed 
to fully address and incorporate the views and concerns of other 
federal agencies, the report found that some concerns of other federal 
agencies, in particular, “the manner in which alternative routes were 
considered in the Department’s EIS were not completely 
incorporated.”143 However, the report used the following as an 
example where the Department “was responsive in trying to address 
concerns that agencies raised.”144 
Environmental Protection Agency officials expressed concerns to 
Department officials of the need for additional analysis in the EIS 
regarding the increased greenhouse gas emissions that may result 
from the increased extraction of tar sands oil in Canada for 
Keystone XL. In response, the Department hired a third-party 
	
140 OIG REPORT, supra note 137, at 26. 
141 Id. at 22. 
142 Id. (emphasis added). 
143 Id. at 21. 
144 Id. at 18–19. 
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contractor to conduct additional analysis, and a full life-cycle 
analysis of greenhouse gas emissions was included in the FEIS.145 
This superficial analysis does not fully answer the question posed 
in the congressional request. Hiring a third-party contractor and 
including its report in the EIS is not responsive to the EPA’s concerns 
if a key conclusion in the report that confirms the EPA’s concerns—
Canadian oil sand “crudes, as likely transported through the proposed 
Project, are on average more GHG-intensive than the crudes they 
would displace in the United States”146—is dismissed in the EIS as 
not relevant due to a conclusion found in a separate report produced 
by an oil industry contractor.147 Further, even if the contracting of the 
report is considered responsive to the concerns raised by the EPA, the 
“conflicting views” of the EPA, an agency with “pertinent expertise,” 
were in the end “apparently ignored” by the State Department in its 
FEIS.148 
4. The State Department’s Decision to Seek Additional Environmental 
Review and Deny the Permit Was Not Due to Public 
Participation Under NEPA on Climate Change 
In November 2011, the State Department announced a decision to 
seek additional information in the Keystone XL permit review 
process, delaying the issuance of a permit by at least a year.149 The 
primary reason cited was the “concentration of concerns [during the 
National Interest Determination public process] regarding the 
environmental sensitivities of the current proposed route through the 
Sand Hills area of Nebraska.” Thus the Department “determined it 
need[ed] to undertake an in-depth assessment of potential alternative 
routes in Nebraska.”150 Under the decision, after the additional 
information is obtained and a public comment period completed on a 
supplement to the FEIS, the Department would determine “whether 
the proposed pipeline [is] in the national interest, considering all of 
the relevant issues together. Among the relevant issues that would be 
	
145 Id. at 19. 
146 ICF REPORT, supra note 107, at 48. 
147 See discussion supra section II.A.2. 
148 See Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1123 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Sierra Club v. 
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1030 (2d Cir. 1983)). 
149 Office of the Spokesperson, Keystone XL Pipeline Project Review Process: 
Decision to Seek Additional Information, U.S. Dep’t of State (Nov. 10, 2011), http:// 
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/176964.htm. 
150 Id. 
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considered are environmental concerns (including climate change), 
energy security, economic impacts, and foreign policy.”151 This 
parenthetical in the last sentence of the State Department’s press 
release was the only mention of climate change in its decision to seek 
additional information for its NID, which is required under Executive 
Order 13,337 for transboundary permits.152 
In January 2012, the State Department and Obama Administration 
denied the permit, a decision compelled by the imposition of a 
politically motivated sixty-day deadline set by Congress in an 
unrelated Act on a temporary payroll tax cut.153 The State Department 
reasoned that sixty days was an insufficient amount of time to 
evaluate the impacts of the pipeline, specifically the concerns dealing 
with the proposed route through the Sand Hills area of Nebraska, and 
make its national interest determination.154 The Department’s 
announcement denying the permit application makes clear that its 
decision will not permanently stop the proposed Keystone XL 
pipeline, explaining that the denial “does not preclude any subsequent 
permit application or applications for similar projects.”155 
While the delay and ultimate denial of the permit were clearly 
victories for those opposed to the pipeline, there is little that suggests 
public participation under NEPA played a role in these decisions. The 
public concerns cited by the State Department as the basis for its 
decisions to delay and deny the permit were raised in the NID 
process, which is separate from the NEPA EIS process, and the 
decisions were ostensibly based primarily on concerns about water 
contamination in the United States. Despite the cursory mention of 
climate change in its press release on the decision to delay and seek 
additional information for its NID, there is no indication that the State 
Department made these decisions due to public concerns raised in the 
NEPA process regarding the GHG and climate change impacts of the 
proposed pipeline. 
  
	
151 Id. (emphasis added). 
152 Exec. Order No. 13,337, supra note 75. 
153 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
154 Id. 
155 Office of the Spokesperson, Denial of the Keystone XL Pipeline Application, U.S. 
Dep’t of State (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/01/181473.htm. 
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B. Public Participation and Access to Information Outside the 
NEPA Process have Proved Effective in Delaying Keystone XL and 
Revealing Flaws in the State Department’s NEPA Review 
The State Department’s overreliance on third-party contractors and 
failure to fully disclose and consider GHG impacts of any additional 
oil sands production caused by the proposed Keystone XL pipeline 
stifled the ability of the public to meaningfully participate on this 
issue in the Department’s NEPA review. Public participation outside 
of the NEPA process, however, has had unambiguous impacts on the 
State Department’s decision-making process. The clearest example 
already discussed is the public participation in the NID process that 
resulted in a one-year delay to seek additional information, followed 
by a denial of the permit for the same reasons but in response to an 
arbitrary deadline imposed by Congress. Further, the OIG special 
review that revealed flaws in the State Department’s permitting 
process, including its lack of resources and overreliance on third-party 
contractors, would not have been initiated but for a request made by 
public representatives.156 
Public use and dissemination of information gained through 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests brought by the 
environmental group Friends of the Earth have also brought attention 
to issues in the Keystone XL permitting process regarding potential 
conflicts of interest. One batch of emails in response to the request 
revealed that the State Department appeared to be playing the role of 
a facilitator and collaborator with TransCanada and not that of an 
oversight agency.157 Another batch of documents supported the 
allegation “that the State Department ha[d] been unduly influenced by 
representatives of TransCanada” through Cardno Entrix, which the 
State Department denied.158 
In a letter sent to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Vermont 
Senator Bernard Sanders stated that a joint meeting between the State 
	
156 See Bernard Sanders et al., supra note 132; OIG REPORT, supra note 137. This 
request was based in part on information that was reported on in a New York Times article. 
See Rosenthal & Frosch, supra note 129. 
157 Rosenthal, supra note 131. 
158 Tom Zeller Jr., Keystone XL: Activists Ask What State Department Is Hiding, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 17, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/17/keystone-
xl-state-department_n_1100176.html (FOE suggests some of the documents provide 
“evidence of deference and special access granted to TransCanada executives by federal 
officials. . . . [O]ne email . . . suggests State Department staff held at least one meeting in 
which representatives of both TransCanada and Cardno ENTRIX . . . were present.”). 
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Department, TransCanada, and Cardno Entrix revealed by the FOIA 
request “appear[ed] completely inappropriate.”159 Senator Sanders 
censured the State Department, stating that if it “allows Cardno Entrix 
to conduct the supplement to the FEIS, it will unnecessarily taint the 
supplement. The State Department should not continue with 
TransCanada’s hand-picked contractor, and should instead select a 
new and truly impartial third-party contractor to conduct the 
supplement.”160 The State Department did end up selecting a separate 
third-party contractor for the environmental review of the new 
Keystone XL pipeline permit application,161 and it seems likely that 
the OIG Report, public access to information through FOIA requests, 
and pressure from public representatives played a role in this shift. 
Protests and civil disobedience provided further political pressure 
on the Obama Administration in an election year.162 In August 2011, 
when the FEIS was issued, protesters held a two-week sit-in action at 
the White House protesting Keystone XL; between August and 
November 2011, 1,253 protesters were arrested at the White House, 
including NASA Scientist James Hansen and religious leaders.163  On 
November 6, 2011, an estimated 10,000 demonstrators surrounded the 
White House calling on President Obama to deny TransCanada the 
permit for Keystone XL.164 Protesters claimed victory when the 
Obama Administration announced its decision to seek additional 
information and delay the issuance of a permit four days later on 
	
159 Letter from Senator Bernard Sanders to Hillary Clinton, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of State 
(Nov. 17, 2011), available at http://sanders.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Letter%20to%20 
Secretary%20Clinton%2011.17.2011.pdf. 
160 Id. 
161 New Keystone XL Pipeline Application, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, KEYSTONE XL 
PIPELINE PROJECT, http://www.keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2012) 
(“[T]he Department of State has selected Environmental Resources Management (known 
as “ERM”) to serve as an independent third-party contractor for its environmental review 
of the proposed Keystone XL pipeline project.”). 
162 See Jeff Mason & Timothy Gardner, Obama Advisers Fret Over Keystone XL 
Pipeline’s Political Risks, REUTERS, Nov. 4, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011 
/11/04/us-usa-politics-obama-keystone-idUSTRE7A279U20111104. 
163 NASA Scientist, Religious Leaders Arrested in Tar Sands Protest, ENV’T NEWS 
SERV., Aug. 29, 2011, http://ens-newswire.com/2011/08/30/nasa-scientist-religious-
leaders-arrested-in-tar-sands-protest/; Lucia Graves & Hunter Stuart, Keystone XL: 
Thousands Gather Outside White House in Culmination of Protests, HUFFINGTON POST, 
Nov. 6, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/06/thousands-gather-in-lafay_n_ 
1078809.html. 
164 Graves & Stuart, supra note 163.  
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November 10th.165 At the time this Article went to press, there were 
demonstrations underway in Texas by landowners and 
environmentalists against the Keystone XL pipeline’s southern leg, 
construction of which began in August 2012.166 
Local government leaders in the U.S. have also publicly pressured 
the Obama Administration to deny the presidential permit for the 
proposed Keystone XL pipeline.167 In a demonstration of widespread 
local community support for rejecting the pipeline, 103 mayors of 
U.S. cities sent a joint letter to President Obama expressing their 
“grave[] concern[] that expansion of tar sands oil imports will 
increase our dependence on this high carbon fuel for decades to 
come.”168 The mayors explained how local community efforts to 
“fight climate change, reduce dependence on oil, and create a clean 
energy future” would be undermined by the national “[e]xpansion of 
high carbon fuels such as tar sands” caused by the permitting of 
Keystone XL and urged the President to find that the proposed 
pipeline was not in the national interest.169 
Judicial challenges to the pipeline are also a form of public 
participation, albeit a more limited form subject to standing 
requirements and usually brought after the decision-making process 
has been completed. The pipeline is being fought in the courts on 
numerous fronts, including NEPA, Endangered Species Act, 
Administrative Procedure Act,170 and eminent domain claims.171 
	
165 Bill McKibben, Big News: We Won. You Won, TAR SANDS ACTION (Nov. 10, 2011, 
4:23 PM), http://www.tarsandsaction.org/big-news-won-won/. 
166 Texas Landowners Join Environmentalists for Historic Blockade of Keystone XL 
Tar Sands Pipeline, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.democracynow.org 
/2012/10/15/texas_landowners_join_environmentalists_for_historic; Dan Frosch, Last-
Ditch Bid in Texas to Try to Stop Oil Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2012, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2012/10/13/us/protesters-gather-at-keystone-xl-site-in-texas.html. The 
permitting of the southern leg of the pipeline was embraced and expedited by the Obama 
Administration. See supra notes 16–19. 
167 Susan Casey-Lefkowitz, Over 100 Mayors Voice Concern Over Keystone XL Tar 
Sands Pipeline, SWITCHBOARD (Nov. 16, 2011), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs 
/sclefkowitz/over_100_mayors_voice_concern.html. 
168 Letter from American Mayors to President Barack Obama (Nov. 16, 2011), 
available at http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/sclefkowitz/Mayors%27%20Joint%20Letter 
%20to%20President%20Obama%20on%20Keystone%20XL%20Pipeline%20Permit%20-
%20Final%20-%20November%2016%2C%202011.pdf. 
169 Id. 
170 See, e.g., First Amended Complaint in Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of 
State, No. 11-cv-345, 2011 WL 5077848 (D. Neb. Oct. 25, 2011) (claims brought by 
NGOs under NEPA, ESA, and APA challenging environmental reviews of the proposed 
Keystone XL pipeline done by federal agencies). 
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Public participation through lawsuits is arguably more effective than 
under the NEPA review process, as courts are able to conduct serious 
inquiries into the facts and, with NEPA claims, the adequacy of the 
EIS. 
III 
CONCLUSION 
NEPA requires our government to fully and transparently disclose 
to the public the impacts of a proposed project. If a proposed project 
means “game over for the climate,”172 the public has both the right to 
know and the right to participate fully in the review process and have 
their voices heard. “Accurate scientific analysis, expert agency 
comments, and public scrutiny are essential to implementing 
NEPA,”173 and while corporations may sugar coat the environmental 
impacts and hide the ball, it is the government’s job under NEPA to 
open up the books and give the public the straight truth. 
The State Department has a clear obligation under NEPA to 
disclose whether the Keystone XL pipeline will increase oil sands 
production in Canada, analyze the resulting GHG and climate change 
impacts, and consider those effects in its environmental review and 
decision-making process. The conclusion by the State Department—
that neither additional oil sands production in Canada nor an increase 
of total global GHG emissions will result from Keystone XL—is not 
only a fundamental flaw in the EIS but a severe limitation on the 
ability of the public to meaningfully participate in the ultimate 
decisions affecting their health and welfare. Because the full effects of 
the pipeline were not disclosed in the EIS, the public was unable to 
comment fully on those effects or weigh in on alternatives. 
	
171 Nathanial Gronewold, Keystone XL: As Texas Farm Owners Square off with 
TransCanada, Pipeline Opponents See an Opening, E&E NEWS, Sept. 13, 2012, 
http://eenews.net/public/energywire/2012/09/13/1. But see Laurel Brubaker Calkins, 
TransCanada’s Keystone Wins Right to Take Pipeline Land, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 28, 2012, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-28/transcanada-s-keystone-wins-right-to-take-
pipeline-land.html. 
172 James Hansen, Game Over for the Climate, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/opinion/game-over-for-the-climate.html. 
173 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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In preparing the FEIS, the State Department had “the duty to 
assess, consider, and respond to all comments.”174 The State 
Department’s overreliance on third-party contractors and failure to 
disclose and consider the full GHG and climate change impacts of the 
proposed pipeline raise questions about whether the Department gave 
“good faith attention” to the public comments175 and took a “hard 
look” at the impacts176 during its environmental review or whether the 
decision to permit the pipeline was already predetermined. The 
possibility that some other future oil transport projects would be built 
that may have similar impacts to Keystone XL does not negate the 
fact that the proposed Keystone XL pipeline would increase oil sands 
production in Canada.177 Nor does it relieve the State Department of 
its obligation under NEPA to disclose, analyze, and consider the 
reasonably foreseeable indirect and cumulative impacts from the 
increased oil sands production caused by the proposed pipeline. The 
State Department’s conclusion that the pipeline would not result in 
additional extraction and production of Canadian oil sands is in direct 
opposition with comments from the EPA and the public, and the 
speculative assumption needed to come to this conclusion further 
demonstrates the Department’s seeming determination to limit 
meaningful participation and permit the project to proceed as soon as 
possible. The efforts of the President to expedite the permitting of the 
southern leg of the pipeline support this observation. 
As the EPA determined, “there is a reasonably close causal 
relationship between issuing a cross-border permit for the Keystone 
XL project and increased extraction of oil sands crude in Canada 
intended to supply the pipeline,”178 and the environmental effects of 
this additional production must be analyzed under NEPA.179 The State 
Department’s refusal to heed the EPA’s advice brings further doubt 
upon its review process and the adequacy of the FEIS. “[A] reviewing 
court ‘may properly be skeptical as to whether an EIS’s conclusions 
	
174 Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 537 (8th Cir. 
2003); see 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4(a) (2012). 
175 Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 565 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1977); see 
40 C.F.R. § 1503.4(a) (2012). 
176 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 
1172, 1194 (9th Cir. 2008). 
177 See DROITSCH, supra note 21, at 1-2; EPA Letter on DEIS, supra note 22, at 3. 
178  EPA Letter on DEIS, supra note 22, at 3. 
179 Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004) (quoting Metro. Edison 
Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983)). 
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have a substantial basis in fact if the responsible agency has 
apparently ignored the conflicting views of other agencies having 
pertinent expertise.’”180 The EPA, a federal agency dedicated to 
environmental protection, clearly possesses such “pertinent 
expertise.” Considering the convergence of EPA and public 
opposition to the State Department’s conclusion, it seems clear that 
public participation in the NEPA process is not capable of modifying 
the State Department’s position in the FEIS on GHG and climate 
change impacts from Keystone XL if the EPA was unable to do so. 
Overall, the State Department’s Keystone XL environmental 
review process under NEPA clearly failed “to promote transparency 
and to ensure public accountability of agency decisions with 
significant environmental effects.”181 Nor did it “ensure that agencies 
take account of those effects before decisions are made and as part of 
the agency’s own decision-making process.”182 Due to the State 
Department’s failure to fully and transparently disclose, analyze, and 
consider GHG impacts of any additional oil sands production caused 
by the proposed Keystone XL pipeline, public participation and 
access to information has not been meaningful or effective in 
integrating global climate change concerns into the State 
Department’s NEPA environmental review process. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the State Department followed the 
letter of NEPA’s procedural requirements, it is certain that the spirit 
and purpose of NEPA were neglected, if not completely ignored. Our 
federal government has “the continuing responsibility . . . to use all 
practicable means . . . to improve and coordinate Federal plans, 
functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may . . . 
fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the 
environment for succeeding generations.”183 As part of that 
responsibility, federal agencies must “recognize the worldwide and 
long-range character of environmental problems” and disclose and 
consider “the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s 
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term 
	
180 Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1123 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Sierra Club v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1030 (2d Cir. 1983)). 
181 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 71, at 9 (describing the two purposes of 
NEPA’s EIS requirement). 
182 Id. (emphasis added). 
183 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1) (2012). 
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productivity.”184 The federal government has utterly failed to 
recognize the “long-range character” of climate change, the urgent 
need to reduce GHG emissions dramatically, and the profound 
consequences for our children and future generations if we continue 
to do nothing. By supporting projects like the Keystone XL 
pipeline—the “fuse to the biggest carbon bomb on the planet”185—our 
government is not only enabling our increasingly destructive 
addiction to fossil fuels, it is completely ignoring the well-founded 
concerns of the public and disregarding the right of future generations 
to inherit a livable planet. 
 
 
	
184 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2)(F), 4332(2)(C)(iv) (2012). 
185 Elizabeth McGowan, NASA’s Hansen Explains Decision to Join Keystone Pipeline 
Protests, REUTERS, Aug. 29, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/29/idUS2575 
90805720110829. 
